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et al.: Workers' Compensation
WORKERS' COMPENSATION

THE SOUTH CAROLINA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT TREATS NONMARITAL

CHILDREN LIKE BASTARDS OUT OF CAROLINA"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over 1.2 million children were born out of wedlock' in the United States in
1993.2 Such births constituted 32% of all U.S. births that year, an increase from 2%
thirty years ago. Of those families with children born out of wedlock, 83% rely on
welfare or other government assistance.4 The public has become increasingly aware
of the unique problems and challenges faced by these children who, through no
choice of their own, may enter the world disadvantaged compared to children that
are born to married parents. At least one such disadvantage faces nonmarital
children in South Carolina: While marital children are entitled to receive workers'
compensation death benefits from a parent regardless of whether they are actually
dependent on the parent for support, nonmarital children must demonstrate some

* Title borrowed from DOROTHY ALLISON, BASTARD OUT OF CAROLINA (1992).

1. Because some people find the term "illegitimate" to be an offensive way to describe children
born to unmarried parents, the terms "nonmarital children" and "children born out of wedlock" will be
used throughout this article. See, e.g., MARTHA T. ZINGO & KEVIN E. EARLY, NAMELEsS PERSONS:
LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINSTNON-MARITAL CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1994). Indeed,
some commentators decry the concept of illegitimacy, finding it "inconceivable that any person's
existence should be deemed 'illegitimate."' Id. Zingo and Early also aver that
[t]he concept of 'illegitimacy' serves no positive social purpose. It stigmatizes the
labeled children, making them the object of scorn and malice, and it devalues
their worth as persons. 'Illegitimacy,' 'illegitimate,' and 'bastard' are concepts
that have yet to become obsolete enough to disappear from society's active
vocabulary and frame of reference.
Id. (citations omitted).
2. Causes ofPoverty, with a Focus on Out-of-Wedlock Births: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Human Resourcesof the Comm. on Ways andMeans, 104th Cong. 50 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing]
(testimony of Nicholas Zill, Vice-President & Director of Child & Family Studies, Westat, Inc.); see
also id. at 24 (statement of Robert Rector, Senior Policy Analyst, Welfare & Family Studies) (stating
number of children born out of wedlock was 1.24 million in 1993).
3. Id. at 15 (statement of Representative Tim Hutchinson); cf id. at 50 (testimony of Nicholas
Zill, Vice-President & Director of Child & Family Studies, Westat, Inc.) (asserting that the percentage
in 1993 was triple the percentage of births outside of marriage in 1970).
4. Id. at 51 (testimony of Nicholas Zill, Vice-President & Director of Child & Family Studies,
Westat, Inc.); cf id. at 26 (statement of Robert Rector, Senior Policy Analyst, Welfare & Family
Studies) (proclaiming that children born out ofwedlock "received some form of welfare benefit for 71
percent of the months since birth").
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degree of dependency before being allowed to share in the monetary retribution for
the death of a parent.'
This article challenges the differential treatment of marital and nonmarital
children under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.6 Part II briefly
examines the Act, detailing the general requisites for recovery by marital children
as opposed to the mandates for nonmarital children. Part III discusses the impact of
the Equal Protection Clause on the disparate classification in the Act. While the
equal protection jurisprudence in the nonmarital child context arguably lacks
clarity,7 the most recent United States Supreme Court case on point suggests the
constitutionality of requiring a greater showing of dependency from nonmarital
children than from marital children.8

Because this most recent decision probably ensures the constitutionality of
South Carolina's disparate treatment of marital and nonmarital children, Part IV
analyzes various definitions of "dependent" found in case law, some of which

basically equalize the treatment ofnonmarital and marital children by utilizing tests
that are easy to satisfy.9 However, other definitions still impose obstacles to a
nonmarital child's recovery of benefits.'" One such definition is described in the
most recent South Carolina Supreme Court case on this issue, albeit arguably in
dicta. That case requires reliance by the child for the "reasonable necessities of life"
before finding dependence."
Finally, Part V details why this reasonable-necessities-of-life standard should

5. See infratext accompanying notes 13-20.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997).
7. Some United States Supreme Court cases indicate that any additional requirement mandated
from nonmarital children that is not also demanded of marital children fails intermediate scrutiny. Cf.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,776 (1977) (striking Illinois statute that allowed nonmarital children
to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers while marital children were permitted to
inherit by intestate succession from both parents); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165
(1972) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Louisiana's denial of workmen's
compensation death benefits to dependent, unacknowledged nonmarital children when marital and
acknowledged nonmarital children also survived).
However, other cases limitthis broad-sweeping approach. Forexample, theUnited States Supreme
Court has upheld distinctions that do not impose "an insurmountable barrier" on nonmarital children.
See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,539 (1971) (upholding Louisiana law that bars an acknowledged,
nonmarital child from sharing equally with marital children in the intestacy inheritance of their father
because the father could have provided for the child in a will or by legitimizing her through a
subsequent marriage or by a statement in an acknowledgment). Moreover, the Court has upheld
classifications that further the administrative convenience ofthe state. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 509 (1976) (upholding Social Security Act's disallowance of a statutory presumption of
dependence to nonmarital children while allowing the presumption for marital children because the
distinction permitted Congress "to avoid the burden and expense of specific case-by-case
determination").
8. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509.
9. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
10. See infra Part IV.D.
11. Adams v. TexFi Indus., 320 S.C. 213,217,464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (quoting Day v. Day,
216 S.C. 334, 342, 58 S.E.2d 83, 87 (1950)).
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not be imposed when allocating death benefits under the Act. Instead, in the

absence of legislative change, judges should follow early South Carolina case law
that construed "dependent" to entitle acknowledged nonmarital children to receive
benefits simply because of the biological relationship of parent and child.' 2
II. ALLOCATING DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Death benefits under the Act are divided among persons who are "wholly
dependent" upon the deceased.' 3 Persons partially dependent do not receive any
benefits if persons wholly dependent exist. 4 One may be deemed wholly dependent
either through a conclusive statutory presumption or through a factual
determination.
A surviving spouse or child is entitled to the conclusive statutory presumption
of being wholly dependent.' 5 The term "child" includes "a posthumous child, a
child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee and a stepchild or
acknowledged[,] illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not
include married children unless wholly dependent."' 6 Accordingly, while a marital
child has no additional mandates to fulfill, section 42-1-70 requires some degree of
dependence before a nonmarital child is entitled to the statutory presumption of
being wholly dependent." Although the requisite level of dependence is not
articulated in the Act,' 8 section 42-1-70 does draw a distinction between children
born out of wedlock who must be "dependent" and married children who must be
"wholly dependent" on the deceased.' 9 As a result, the level of dependence required
for the former is probably something less than "wholly dependent."20 However, the
very idea that nonmarital children must prove something greater than marital
children to recover death benefits raises constitutional concerns.

12. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, 259 S.C. 99, 102, 190 S.E.2d 751,753 (1972). Popular opinion
also seems to support this idea of equal treatment that will result when the relationship is the only
benchmark for recovery. Although no statistics have been gathered in South Carolina, in a survey of
2031 families in Illinois in 1971, 87% agreed that a nonmarital child "should have the same rights
involving the payment of benefits for the death or disability ofthe father" as a child of legitimate birth.
HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 161, 168 (1971). Only 9% of those
interviewed disagreed. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
14. Id.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-110 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976); accordALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(6)
(Michie 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(5) (West 1991); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 9103(c) (1995);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3(1) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12) (1991).

17. S.C. CODEANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
18. See infra Part IV, for an examination of case law.
19. See supratext accompanying note 16.
20. Adams v. TexFi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217, 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995).
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION GROUNDS FOR REJECTING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
A.

The GeneralRule RegardingClassificationsBased on Legitimacy

Despite a muddied and gradual evolution,2' classifications based on the marital
status of the parents must serve important state interests and be substantially related
to those objectives to pass constitutional muster.' This intermediate scrutiny test is
easier to satisfy than the exacting test of strict scrutiny,' yet more rigorous than
rational basis24 inquiries. The preference for intermediate scrutiny over a rational
basis inquiry of classifications based on birth status stems from the perceived social
attitude that nonmarital children are less deserving.s Consequently, compensation
statutes are unconstitutional if the statutes discriminate against nonmarital children

without satisfying intermediate scrutiny."
21. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67 (1977) (adopting the rational basis test,
rejecting the strict scrutiny test, but affirming that the scrutiny '"is not a toothless one' (quoting
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976))); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1976)
(utilizing phrases like "'legitimate [governmental] interest"' and "possibly rational," which herald the
rational basis test, and 'fundamental personal rights,"' which signals the strict scrutiny test, in
determining whether a classification based on illegitimacy was constitutional (quoting Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972))); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (imposing a
rational basis test by stating that "[t]hough the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether
the line drawn is a rational one"). See generallyZiNGO & EARLY, supra note 1, at 41-94 (discussing
the complex evolution of intermediate scrutiny in United States Supreme Court cases).
22. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464 (1988) (holding Pennsylvania's six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions did notwithstand heightened scrutiny because the limitation period was "not
substantially related to [the states's] interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims"
when other state customs or laws demonstrated that problems of proof were not insurmountable).
23. Under this standard, classifications are permissible only if "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
24. To survive a constitutional inquiry under this standard, a classification must only be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
25. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-23, at 1060 (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting Mathews, 427 U.S. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); cf Trimble, 430 U.S. at 775 n.16 (1977)
(rejecting a state's argument for an easier standard of proof because nonmarital children are a
"disadvantaged group [that have] been.., frequent target[s] of discrimination"); Weber, 406 U.S. at
172-73 (mixing the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests with such language as "legitimate state
interest" and"fundamental personal rights"); infra text accompanying notes 130-33 (detailing historical
perspective that nonmarital children have no rights against their fathers).
Some commentators explain this historical condemnation by focusing on society's abhorrence of
persons born outside the bonds of a legally recognized marital unit... ; their
birth is not 'in accordance with law.' Such persons are deemed a serious threat
to the traditionally defined family which relies . . . upon institutionalized
patriarchy-with its concepts and practices of monogamy, monandry, private
property, heterosexuality, and legitimacy-for survival. Those born out of
wedlock symbolize a violation of societal norms. Products of unsanctioned
unions, the infant issue have historically borne the stigma of a condemnatory
label.
ZINGO & EARLY, supra note 1, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
26. Jeter,486 U.S. at 465; Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776; New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
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In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has decided when
distinctions based on birth status violate the Equal Protection Clause.'

Unfortunately, the cases often complicate, rather than clarify, when state interests
are sufficiently important or when the means are substantially related.2" However,
the majority opinion in Mathews v. Lucas29 does provide some elucidation and
seems to ensure that the dependency distinction in the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act will survive an attack on equal protection grounds, despite
strong criticism from other members of the Court and from constitutional law
scholars. °

411 U.S. 619, 620-21 (1973); Weber, 406 U.S. at 176. See generallyIrwin J. Schiffres, Annotation,
Discriminationon Basis oflllegitimacy As Denialof ConstitutionalRights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613 (1971
& Supp. 1997) (discussing cases and proper scrutiny standard for distinctions based on illegitimacy).
27. For example, in Weber the Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that permitted
marital and acknowledged nomnarital children to recover on an equal footing, but that also allowed
unacknowledged, nonmarital children to recover only if not enough surviving marital and
acknowledged, nonmarital children exist "to exhaust the maximum allowable benefits." Weber, 406
U.S. at 167-68. However, because that case involved only children who were actually dependent on the
decedent, id. at 169-70,174 n.12, it offers less meaningful commentary on the issue of distinctions
based on dependency than a case like Mathews, which does address such classifications.
28. For example, the Court has drawn distinctions, seemingly without any analysis, between
means that are and that are not, substantially related to a governmental interest. Compare Weber, 406
U.S. at 170 (distinguishing its finding that the differential treatment of unacknowledged, nonmarital
children from marital children would not promote the state interest of protecting legitimate family
relationships in the workers' compensation context from "the substantial state interest in providing for
'the stability of... land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the valid ownership of
property left by decedents' that may be cited for support of distinctions in intestacy statutes (quoting
Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449,452 (La. Ct. App. 1969))), with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,
539-40 (1971) (upholding a Louisiana intestacy succession statute denying a nonmarital child
inheritance rights when the father had acknowledged, but not legitimated, his daughter because "the
State has [not] created an insurmountable barrier to [the] illegitimate child" in that the father still could
have included her in his will or legitimated her).
Even this "insurmountable barrier" rationale has been questioned in a more recent case. Trimble,
430 U.S. at 773 ("[Ihe focus on the presence or absence of an insurmountable barrier is somewhat of
an analytical anomaly."). Indeed, if the law cannot be sustained on the analysis of
whether [the] statutory differentiation on the basis of illegitimacy is justified by
the promotion of recognized state objectives..., [then] it is not clear how it can
be saved by the absence of an insurmountable barrier to inheritance under other
and hypothetical circumstances ....
Hard questions cannot be avoided by a
hypothetical reshuffling of the facts.
Id. at 774.
Additionally, while ensuring that nonmarital children are treated equally in the wrongful death
context, the Court is willing to impose greater burdens on nonnarital children in the context of Social
Security benefits. Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (striking down a statute
excluding nonmarital children from the class of children entitled to recover for the wrongful death of
a parent), with Mathews 427 U.S. at 509 (finding a classification distinguishing between marital and
nonmarital children under the Social Security Act "reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency
at death").
29. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
30. See infratext accompanying notes 37-49.
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A. Mathews v. Lucas
1.

The Case and the Resulting Criticismof Its Approach

TheMathews Court addressed the constitutionality ofthe Social Security Act's
provision of benefits to children under eighteen, or to students under twenty-two,
if they are dependent at the time of the parent's death. 3 However, marital children
or children "who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the... parent's
estate under the applicable state intestacy law" are presumed to be dependent
without individualized proof?2 Additionally, the statutory presumption was
available for those children whose fathers had acknowledged them in writing, "had
been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or had been ordered by a court to
' Thus, the Act required nonmarital
support the child because the child was his."33
children who did not fall within these categories to individually prove factual
dependency.
In Mathews the Court denied the two children the statutory presumption of
dependency. The children had lived with their father, one for the first thirteen and
the other for the first six years of their lives,34 and no one contested his paternity.35
However, the children were not dependents because they were not living with their
father or supported by him at his death and they did not meet the requirements of
statutory dependency-the father had not acknowledged them in writing, nor had
a court decreed him to be their father or ordered him to pay their support, and "the
children could not inherit [his] personal property under the intestacy law of the
36
[state]."
The majority of the United States Supreme Court upheld the classification,
using an arguably inappropriate rational basis standard. Throughout the opinion,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, used words signaling minimal scrutiny,
[governmental] interest"'37 and the classifications as
referring to the "'legitimate
3
'
' Such
"reasonably related" and as "possibly rational."39
terms compose the rational
40
basis test, not the intermediate test now deemed to be applicable to classifications

31. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 498 & n.1.
32. Id. at 498-99.
33. Id. at 499.
34. Id. at 497.
35. Id. at 501.
36. Id. at 500-01.
37. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 504 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173

(1972)).
38. Id. at 509.
39. Id. at 505; cf id. at 519-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for allowing the
discrimination without "something more than a 'possibly rational' basis"). See generallyZINGO &
EARLY, supra note 1, at 65-68 (criticizing the Court for using a "possibly rational" test when
intermediate scrutiny was undisputedly required).
40. See supranote 24.
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based on birth status.4 Additionally, the majority upheld the classification because
it advanced the state interest of administrative convenience,42 an interest
that has
43
repeatedly failed constitutional scrutiny under the intermediate test.
In all fairness to the majority, the level of scrutiny for classifications based on
birth status was not clearly articulated until thirteen years after this case.44 However,
even if at that time the majority was not applying the "wrong" constitutional
standard, its decision has still been met with criticism because it supported a
classification that is both overinclusive and underinclusive. 5 In Jimenez v.
Weinberger the Court held such an overinclusive and underinclusive statute
unconstitutional in the context of disability benefits because the statute presumed
all marital children and some nonmarital children were dependent on the disabled
wage earner when many were not dependent, and it excluded some nonmarital
children who were dependent on the disabled wage earner.47
Similarly, because "legitimate as well'as illegitimate children are sometimes
abandoned by their father before his death," the overinclusive presumption in
Mathews will allow some marital children to recover when they are not dependent
on the father at the time of his death.48 The classification in Mathews is also
underinclusive. The statute prevented two children who had relied for many years
on the decedent for support and who were acknowledged orally as his children from
receiving benefits simply because, at the time of his death, they could not
demonstrate any of the four arbitrary indicia that the statute mandated.49
Despite the convincing arguments advanced by Justice Stevens in his dissent
and by various constitutional law scholars since, the case has not been overruled or

41. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
42. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509-10.

43. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (rejecting such an interest ina case involving
discrimination against an unwed father ina custody battle because "the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency"); TRIBEsupranote25, § 16-23, at 1059-60 (questioning the viability
ofMathews because ofthis acceptance of administrative inconvenience); cf Mathews, 427 U.S. at 519
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (decrying the majority's acceptance of a classification without "a weightier
governmental interestthan merely'administrative convenience"' (quoting themajority in Mathews, 427

U.S. at 509)).
At least two gender discrimination cases, which are also subjected to the intermediate test, see
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988), have held administrative convenience not to satisfy the
important governmental interestprong. Craigv. Boren, 429U.S. 190,198 (1976) ("Decisions following
Reed similarly have rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives
to justify gender-based classifications."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973)
(plurality) ("[B]y according differential treatment... for the sole purpose of achieving administrative
convenience, the challenged statutes violate [the Constitution.]").
44. See supranotes 21-22 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, at 1060 (criticizing the Mathews decision on various

grounds).
46. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
47. Id. at 636-37.
48. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at517-18.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 16

1288

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1281

even substantially limited by the Court.
2. Mathews's Impact on South CarolinaLaw
The Mathews Court's readiness and willingness to allow Congress to treat
nonmarital children differently than marital children under the Social Security Act
seems to support the South Carolina General Assembly's decision to require a
showing of dependence by nonmarital children, but not by marital children, under
the Workers' Compensation Act. Still, the constitutionality of the classification is
questionable. South Carolina should diverge from the Mathews decision and
provide greater protection for nonmarital children now that the intermediate
standard is clearly the accepted level of scrutiny."0 Moreover, even if one supports
the Mathews reasoning, the South Carolina statute imposes a much greater
limitation on the ability ofnonmarital children to achieve the statutory presumption
of dependency than the provision of the Social Security Act involved in Mathews.
The Court explicitly stated the requirements for dependency under the Social
Security Act.5 ' In contrast, under section 42-1-70 of the South Carolina Code,
acknowledgment alone will not suffice; instead, the nonmarital child must also be
dependent. 2 The most recent interpretation of "dependency" in South Carolina
basically equates the term with a complete disallowance of the statutory
presumption of dependency for nonmarital children. In sum, although the Mathews
case appears to support the South Carolina distinction between nonmarital and
marital children, various criticisms of Mathews and the more onerous requirement
under South Carolina statutory law may lead a state court to find the differential
classification unconstitutional.
IV. THE MEANING OF DEPENDENT

Because the constitutionality of the South Carolina distinction is uncertain, but
arguably constitutional, other avenues for achieving equalized treatment for
nonmarital children must be examined. Assuming that the added requirement of
dependency on nonmarital children is constitutional, this Part examines possible
meanings that may be ascribed to the term that will most fairly provide for children
born out of wedlock.

50. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
52. S.C. COD- ANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
53. See infra Part IV.D (detailing the test in Adams v. TexFi Industries, 320 S.C. 213, 217, 464
S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995), which mandates actual dependence).
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A. DependencyMeans Only the BiologicalRelationshipBetween Parentand
Child
Despite the absence of a statutory definition of dependency in the Workers'
Compensation Act, courts have construed "dependent" under the Act to include a
decedent's acknowledged, nonmarital children who were not actually supported by
the decedent.54 In Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that even though three acknowledged, nonmarital children received only
irregular and insubstantial support from their father, they were entitled to the
compensation benefits over the decedent's mother, father, sisters, and brothers.55 No
surviving spouse or marital children claimed benefits.56 The court found that the
biological relationship alone between the father 7 and child satisfied the statutory
requirement of dependency because the relationship itself"imposes upon thefather
8
the duty to support the child, andconfers upon the child the rightto support.""
Advocates of a more rigorous showing of dependency for nonmarital children

54. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 103-04, 190 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1972).
55. Id. The victory of the nonmarital child over the decedent's siblings in Flemon can be
explained by understanding the differential treatment between siblings and children of the decedent.
Married siblings must be "wholly dependent" upon the employee to receive benefits, but stepchildren
and nonmarital children must only be "dependent." S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Consequently, nonmarital children have a less onerous burden to carry than siblings before being
allowed to recover. However, the successful outcome for the nonmarital child over the decedent's
parents cannot be so easily explained because parents, like stepchildren and nonmarital children,
receive benefits "if dependent." Id. § 42-1-170. As a result, the showing required is no more difficult
for parents than for nonmarital children.
56. Flemon, 259 S.C. at 100, 190 S.E.2d at 752.
57. This text refers to the paternal parent because generally the mother of a child born out of
wedlock is the primary caretaker of the child. Hearing,supranote 2, at 50 (testimony ofNicholas Zill,
Vice-President & Director of Child & Family Studies, Westat, Inc.); id. at 116 (testimony of Audrey
Rowe, Executive Vice-President, National Urban League).
Even fathers ordered to share in the care giving function often fail to do so. For instance,
nationally
[i]n 1985, 61.3% of women seeking child support for their own children under
twenty-one years of age were awarded such payments, but 1,138,000 did not
receive payments due ....
Payment was not awarded to 3,411,000 women. The
mean child support was $2,215. Women who did not receive payments had a
mean money income of $10,837. Among women below the poverty level,
1,130,000 were awarded a mean income of $1,383. These are figures for a year,
not a month.
ZINGO & EARLY,supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Ann Fagan Ginger, Enforcingthe Hidden US. Equal
RightsLaw, 20 GOLDENGATEU.L.REV. 385,407 (1990)). Consequently, for questions ofdependency
in the absence of actual support, the father is the parent most often the focus of the inquiry.
58. Flemon, 259 S.C. at 102, 190 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Lippard v. Southeastern Express Co.,
177 S.E. 801, 802 (N.C. 1935) (emphasis added)); cf Wilder v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 477 S.W.2d
1,3 (Tenn. 1972) (denying nonmarital child death benefits because the adoption of the child before the
father's death by the father's parents terminated the legal relationship between the natural father and
child). But see Sweeton v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 164 S.W.2d 1010, 1011 (Tenn. 1942)
("Relationship is only evidence of and not the real test of dependency.").
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may argue that the biological relationship test is appropriate under the facts of
Flemon when no surviving spouse or marital children make a claim for the
employee's death benefits, and the nonmarital child is actually the closest living
relative. However, case law, and sound reasons discussed below in Part V, support
the Flemon position that actual dependency is not required for receipt of death
benefits even when spouses and marital children are additional claimants. For
example, several North Carolina cases embrace the biological relationship test. 9
Because South Carolina's Workers' Compensation law was modeled on the North
Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, "the opinions of the Supreme Court of

North Carolina construing [its] Act are entitledto greatweight!"6 in South Carolina.
In Hewett v. Garrett" the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a decedent's
acknowledged, nonmarital daughter could equally share death benefits with the
decedent's widow even though the decedent had not financially supported the child
after he separated from the mother. 62 In so ruling, the court focused on the father's
parental relationship, which ensured a continuing legal responsibility to the child
long after the father severed ties with the mother.63
Additionally and applying the same rationale, the North Carolina court in
Lippardv. SoutheasternExpress Co.' found that a posthumous, nonmarital child
of the decedent was entitled to share death benefits with three marital children when
the decedent died four days before his wedding to the nonmarital child's mother.65
The court held that "the right of the child to compensation grows out of the
relationship, which in itself.., confers upon the child the right to support by its
father."" In sum, the biological relationship between father and child alone creates
a "legal" '67 dependence that exists even in the absence of actual dependence.
B. A Legal Obligationof Support Satisfies the DependentRequirement
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also recognized that a father's legal
duty of support renders a child dependent under section 42-1-70.68 In a brief
paragraph after endorsing the biological relationship test of dependence, the Flemon
court cited as additional support for its holding "that both under the law of this state

59. See infra text accompanying notes 61-67.
60. Flemon, 259 S.C. at 101, 190 S.E.2d at 752; see Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 412, 73
S.E.2d 449, 451 (1952); McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S.C. 173, 181, 41 S.E.2d 872, 876

(1947).
61. 163 S.E.2d 372 (N.C. 1968).
62. Id. at 375; accord Foy v. Vann, 386 So. 2d 1141, 1144 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that
a nonmarital child can recover equally with two siblings who are marital children of the decedent).
63. Hewett, 163 S.E.2d at 375.
64. 177 S.E. 801 (N.C. 1935).
65. Id. at 802.
66. Id.
67. Hewett, 163 S.E.2d at 375.

68. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 103-04, 190 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1972).
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as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Law, and
that existing at the time of Flemon's death, a legal duty was imposed upon a father
to support his illegitimate children."'6 9
Moreover, although addressing the dependency of a bigamous wife instead of
anonmarital child, the South Carolina Supreme Court indicated in Day v. Day70 that
a legal obligation of support impacts on the finding of dependency. 7' The court
stated that dependency "only includes those persons that the decedent has a legal
duty to support."72 Other jurisdictions have also held that the legal obligation of
support means the child is dependent.73
Because dependency may stem from a duty of support, courts should analyze
the applicable statutory law and case law. Sections 20-7-90(A) and 20-7-100 of the
Children's Code provide possible sources for the imposition of the support
obligation. Unfortunately, according to the statutory language, whether a person has
a legal duty to support nonmarital children under section 20-7-90(A) depends on
whether the child is dependent on the parent. 7' This circular reasoning offers little
enlightenment in this area: A nonmarital child is a child under the Workers'
Compensation Act if dependent; 75 a child is dependent according to Flemon and
Day if the parent is legally obligated to make support payments;76 however, a parent
is legally obligated to make support payments under section 20-7-90(A) of the
Children's Code only if the nonmarital child is dependent.77
Fortunately, section 20-7-90(A) does not provide the exclusive basis for a legal
obligation of support; section 20-7-100 imposes an equal duty regarding the welfare

69. Id.Note that "Workmen's" in the title of the Act was changed to "Workers"' in 1982 by the
South Carolina General Assembly. Act of Mar. 22, 1982, No. 303, 1982 S.C. Acts 2027.

70. 216 S.C. 334,58 S.E.2d 83 (1950).
71. Id. at 342, 58 S.E.2d at 86-87.
72. Id.
73. Hewett v. Garrett, 163 S.E.2d 372, 375 (N.C. 1968); cf Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 247 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Ill 1969) (detailing Illinois statutory law requiring a father to support
a nonmarital child to the same degree as the father of a nomnarital child); Black Mountain Corp. v.
Jones, 142 S.W.2d 973, 974 (Ky. Ct. App. 1940) (finding dependency determinable by the moral or
legal obligation of an employee to support the claimant only when the dependency is presumed);
Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 340 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Tenn. 1960) (holding that the state's
Bastardy Act made the father ofanonmarital child responsible for its necessary support and education,
bringing nonmarital children within the class of children conclusively presumed to be dependent). But
see Brooks v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 85 A.2d 471, 473 (Md. Ct. App. 1952) ("Legal or moral duty to
support is not necessary, and in the absence of actual support is not sufficient, to constitute
dependency."); Parson v. Murphy, 163 N.W. 847, 848 (Neb. 1917) (holding dependency is not based
solely on present legal obligation to support).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-90(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Interestingly, imposing no legal
obligation of support ofnonmarital children violates the Equal Protection Clause. Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that a Texas statute granting a judicially enforceable
right ofsupport to marital children, but not nonmarital children, violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
75. S.C. CODEANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
76. See supratext accompanying notes 69-74.
77. S.C. CODE, ANN. § 20-7-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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and education of minor children on each parent."8 Providing for the welfare of a
child almost certainly includes providing support payments for a child. Indeed, the
term connotes an even broader duty than mere support payments-not only
providing monetary support for a child's physical needs but also giving care,
nurturing, time, and teaching to meet a child's moral and emotional needs.79 The
definition of a "parent" under the Children's Code includes a "biological parent,""0
and a "child" is defined more broadly here than under the Workers' Compensation
Act. Under the Children's Code, a child is "a person under the age of eighteen."'"
Consequently, unlike under the Workers' Compensation Act, section 20-7-100
protects a nonmarital child regardless of the definition of dependent. Under the
authority of this statute then, a parent is legally obligated to provide for a child's
welfare; and this legal obligation makes any child, marital or not, dependent under
the common law? 2
Case law also indicates that the duty of support exists independently of section
20-7-90(A). 3 In Campbell v. Campbell," a case that addressed only the legal
obligation of a father for the support of his marital minor children, the court
supported the notion that a legal duty is an obligation not limited to the terms of
section 20-7-90(A), but rather derived from concepts of "natural right[s] and
justice." 5 Indeed, the court expressly stated that "[n]o one.., can successfully
contend that the criminal remedy [which section 20-7-90(A) imposes on persons
capable of earning a living, but who fail to support their children] standing alone
could be considered adequate from the standpoint of the child who is legally entitled
to support from its parent." 6
In sum, once entitled to support, a child is deemed dependent; 7 and this
dependency would qualify nonnarital children for death benefits under the workers'
compensation laws."

78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
79. THERANDOMHOUSEDICTIONARYOFTHEENGLISHLANGUAGE 1619 (unabridged ed. 1973);
cf WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2900 (unabridged 2d

ed. 1936).
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(l) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
82. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 104,190 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1972); Day v. Day,

216 S.C. 334, 342, 58 S.E.2d 83, 86-87 (1950).
83. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-7-90(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("Any able-bodied person capable of
earning a livelihood who shall, without just cause or excuse, abandon or fail to provide reasonable
support to [a] spouse or to [a] minor unmarried legitimate or illegitimate child dependent upon him or

her shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .....
84. 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E.2d 237 (1942).
85. Id. at 73, 20 S.E.2d at 239.
86. Id. at 74, 20 S.E.2d at 239-40.

87. See supratext accompanying notes 68-73.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-110 (Law. Co-op.
1976).
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C. UnmarriedMinors as Dependents
Although the Children's Code fails to define the term dependency, case law
interpreting dependency under that part of the South Carolina Code suggests that
parents owe a duty of support to unmarried minors.8 9 These cases so held even
though section 20-7-90 extends the duty of support only to minor, unmarried,
dependent children born out of wedlock. 90 Stated differently, the courts are
seemingly treating the term dependent as mere surplusage-instead focusing on the
limitations of "minor" and "unmarried," and after finding those adjectives satisfied,
assuming dependence. Otherjurisdictions similarly focus on the tender years of the
child in determining dependency. 9'
If courts interpreting section 42-1-70 of the Workers' Compensation Act
similarly assumed dependency after determining the claiming beneficiary is a minor
and unmarried, nonmarital children would be on an equal footing with marital
children, ajust result that is arguably mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment 2 and
other rationales.93 In fact, if a court or the General Assembly was to embrace any
of these three bases for finding dependency, biological relationship, legal
obligation, or unmarried minor qualities; then nonmarital children could recover
death benefits as often as marital children. The tests are that simple to satisfy.
However, the most recent meaning ascribed by the South Carolina Supreme Court

89. Carpenter v. Hawley, 281 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming Industrial
Commission's decision to disallow death benefits to acknowledged nonmarital child because she had
turned eighteen just prior to the employee's death); State v. Montgomery, 246 S.C. 545, 546-47, 144
S.E.2d 797, 798 (1965) (holding statutory provisions extend to failure to support minor, unmarried
children whether marital or not); Marshall v. Richardson, 240 S.C. 318, 323, 125 S.E.2d 639, 642
(1962) (stating section 20-7-90 amended to impose obligation of support ofminor, unmarried children
regardless if marital or nonmarital).
90. S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-90(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
91. See, e.g., Hunter v. Goodstein Bros., 156 N.Y.S.2d 699,703 (App. Div. 1956) (emphasizing
the special "case of a child so young" and "the presumption [of dependency that arises] from the tender
age of the child").
The New York court, in interpreting the same definition of child as in South Carolina, see id. at
702, basically shifted the burden of proving dependency away from the claimant. Instead, it required
those opposing the nonmarital child's receipt of benefits to produce evidence demonstrating
nondependency of the acknowledged, nonmarital, four-year-old child before the presumption of
dependency inherent in a child of tender years was overcome. Id. at 703; cf McFadden v. Duo
Plumbing & Heating Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 279,279-80 (App. Div. 1979) (holding that the presumption
of dependency of four nonmarital children between the ages of five and twelve was not overcome when
the claimants presented evidence that the decedent claimed the children on his tax returns and testimony
of the decedent's brother and the children's mother regarding their dependence on the father for
support).
92. See supraPart I (discussing Equal Protection argument against the differential treatment
under the Workers' Compensation Act).
93. See infraPart V (examining legislative deference and the annihilation of the unjust historical
position of nonmarital children as reasons for equalizing treatment under the Workers' Compensation

Act).
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in Adams v. TexFi Industries" seemingly requires substantially more from a
nonmarital child.
D. Adams v. TexFi Industries: South CarolinaInvokes a New Meaning
According to dicta in Adams, "in order for... acknowledged illegitimate
children to be deemed dependent,"96 they must look "'to another for support and97
maintenance; [they must rely] on another for the reasonable necessities of life.'
In Adams the court was faced with allocating the death benefits of a man survived
by a wife, an adopted daughter, and a stepdaughter.98 The Commissioner had
determined that the widow should receive 50% and that the adopted daughter and
stepchild should receive 25% each." The Appellate Panel awarded the adopted
child and widow 50% each, finding that the stepdaughter was not entitled to the
wholly dependent statutory presumption.'0 The panel reasoned that the term

dependent in section 42-1-70 modified nonmarital children and stepchildren.' '

94. 320 S.C. 213, 464 S.E.2d 109 (1995).
95. The standard is arguably dicta as to nonmarital children because the facts of the case only
involved a stepchild. Id. at 217, 464 S.E.2d at 112.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Dayv. Day, 216 S.C. 334, 342, 58 S.E.2d 83, 86-87 (1950)); see also Glens Falls
Indemnity Co. v. Jordan, 193 S.E. 96, 96, 98-99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937) (holding the parents of the
decedent, who are never entitled to the statutory presumption of dependency under the workers'
compensation act, demonstrated dependency by evidence that the deceased son made regular and
substantial weekly contributions to them); Russell v. Johnson, 42 N.E.2d 392,395 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942)
(holding minor children who lived with their mother and decedent-not their natural father-were
dependent under the workers' compensation act because the decedent provided them with food,
clothing, and housing); King v. Illinois Steel Corp., 176 N.E. 161,162-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931) (holding
sister of the decedent was at least partially dependent on her brother when he paid the light, gas, and
coal bills and contributed finds for food and home maintenance); Meyler v. Mayor & City Council, 17
A.2d 762,763-64,766 (Md. Ct. App. 1941) (ordering anewtrial to determine actual dependency under
the workers' compensation act when a stepchild quit her job after the decedent stepfather asked her to
stay home and look after their home); Rodesky v. City of Paterson, 17 A.2d 49, 50 (N.J. Workmen's
Comp. Bureau 1940) (holding that a brother, who is never entitled to the statutory presumption of
dependency, and who had his own job and at least two personal checking accounts was not dependent
on the decedent); cf Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 N.E.2d 892, 894 (il. 1947)
(awarding husband death benefits under dependency test requiring one to look to another for support
or for reasonable necessaries consistent with the dependent's position in life); Crane Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 37 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. 1941) (granting death benefits to fifteen-year-old sister of decedent
brother under same dependency test); Weil-Kalter Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 N.E.2d 889, 893
(Ill. 1941) (holding husband entitled to death benefits under same dependency test); Postal Mut.
Indemnity Co. v. Penn, 165 S.W.2d 495, 497 (rex. Civ. App. 1942) (finding brother a dependent in
accordance with the mandates of the workers' compensation act under a definition requiring one to rely
on another in whole or in part for reasonable necessaries in a substantial amount).
98. Adams, 320 S.C. at 215, 464 S.E.2d at 111.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Adams v. TexFi Indus., 314 S.C. 313,315-16,443 S.E.2d 913,915 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd,
320 S.C. 213, 464 S.E.2d 109 (1995).
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Because the stepchild received monetary support from her natural father and the
stepchild's mother earned $20,000 annually, she could not satisfy the modifier
"dependent."' 2 Because the supreme court adopted anew standard, it remanded the
case to the Workers' Compensation Commission for an adjudication on whether the
stepchild satisfied the new test of reliance on the father "for the reasonable
necessities of life."' 0 3
If the Adams reasonable-necessities-of-life reliance test were extended to
nonmarital children, it would undermine the ability ofnonmarital children to receive
the statutory presumption of dependence under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Instead, nonmarital children will have to show actual dependence before they are
ever deemed deserving of death benefits. Even though they are unmarried minors 1"
and all parents are responsible for the welfare and education of their biological
children, this will not be sufficient."0 5 By requiring such a showing, theAdams court
has discriminated against nomarital children, foreclosing them from the
opportunity to stand on an equal footing with their marital siblings.
V. REASONS FOR REJECTING THE ADAMS TEST

After the discussion in Part IV ofthe various meanings of dependency, this Part
discusses why the Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc.'" definition focusing on the
biological relationship is superior to the Adams v. TexFi Industries 7 definition,
which focuses on the actual reliance of the child on the father for support.
A.

DistinguishingAdams andDay v. Dayfrom the NonmaritalChildContext

The Adams court adopted the reasonable-necessities-of-life reliance test from

102. Id. at 315-16, 443 S.E.2d at 914-15.
103. Adams, 320 S.C. at 217,464 S.E.2d at 112.
In adapting its new test, the Adams court rejected North Carolina's arguably more rigorous
"substantial dependence" standard, articulated in Winsteadv. Derreberry,326 S.E.2d 66,71 (N.C. Ct
App. 1985). In Winstead the North Carolina court held that stepchildren can recover death benefits if
substantially dependent on the decedent. Id. at 71. The substantial dependency test is not as rigorous
as entirely dependent and not as lax as "any economic dependency." Id. Factors to be considered in
evaluating whether the standard threshold is met in a given case include the following: (1) "the actual
amount and consistency of [monetary] support... [received from] the deceased stepparent,.., the
natural parent married to the stepparent,... [and] and the estranged natural parent, ...[;(2)] the
income ofthe stepchild[;] and [(3)] any other funds regularly received for the support ofthe stepchild."
Id. Applying these factors to the facts in Winstead,the court found that the decedent's contribution of
84% to the stepchildren's support satisfied the standard. Id. at 72.
104. See supra Part IV.C.
105. See supra Part IV.B.
106. 259 S.C. 99, 190 S.E.2d 751 (1972); see alsosupraPart IV.A (discussing the case in greater
detail).
107. 320 S.C. 213, 464 S.E.2d 109 (1995); see also supra Part IV.D (analyzing the case and its
impact on the Workers' Compensation Act).
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Day v. Day.'9 Adams addressed whether a stepchild should recover death
benefits,' 9 and the Day court determined that a woman who was married
simultaneously to the decedent and another man could not recover death benefits."'
Although purportedly laying down a generally applicable rule, the facts in both
cases were very different from that of a nonmarital child's attempt to recover.
Understandably, a court would want to draw a more narrow rule of dependence in
a case involving the dependence of a bigamous wife because of the state's public
policy of fostering and protecting marriages."' The same standard arguably would
not apply in determining the dependence of a childof a bigamous wife because the
child is innocent of wrongdoing and should not be punished for the misdeeds of
' 2
parents. 1
Similarly, a rule involving stepchildren should be more narrowly drawn than
one concerning nonmarital children because in the latter case, society has a vested
interest in providing incentives for parents to take responsibility for the children
they bring into the world. Stepparents play no role in the conception of the child,
and their maximum responsibility would be voluntarily or personally assumed.
Moreover, nonmarital children traditionally enjoy greater protection than
stepchildren under the law."3 Stepchildren are not expressly included under the
support statute in the South Carolina Children's Code,"14possibly to avoid imposing
a duty of support on both the stepchildren and the natural parents." 5
The same analysis applies under the Workers' Compensation statute.
Stepchildren may already be the marital children of some parent and so would be
entitled to the wholly dependent presumption and death benefits from that natural
parent. Additionally, the more temporal bond between stepparent and stepchild
arguably merits less protection. Quite reasonably then, the supreme court
determined in Adams to make the threshold of dependence higher for stepchildren

108. 216 S.C. 334, 58 S.E.2d 83 (1950).
109. Adams, 320 S.C. at 215, 464 S.E.2d at 111.
110. Day, 216 S.C. at 345,58 S.E.2d at 88.
111. Id. at 344-45, 58 S.E.2d at 88.
112. Russell v. Jordan, 42 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942) (holding children of a married
woman living illicitly with the decedentwere entitled to workers' compensation death benefits because
"their rights should [not] be measured... by the crime or immorality of their mother"); cf Fuller v.
Carrs Fork Coal Co., 132 S.W.2d 540,541 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939) ("Mhe child of a bigamous marriage

is entitled to compensation under evidence tending to show that the father had recognized his parental
responsibility.").
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-90(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (imposing duty on able-bodied
persons to provide support for their nonmarital children dependent upon them, but not imposing such
a duty on stepparents).
114. See id.
115. Cf Winstead v. Dereberry, 326 S.E.2d 66,72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that allowing
non-legally dependent children to recover death benefits would not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the stepchildren may "receive death benefits from the
stepparent based on substantial factual dependency and from the estranged natural parent under the
conclusive presumption of total dependency for a natural child").
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instead of entitling them to an automatic presumption of being wholly dependent
on stepparents.
The same rationales simply do not apply to nonmarital children. Although the
usage of the same term "dependent" to modify both stepchildren and nonmarital
children" 6 arguably was intended to apply to both nonmarital children and
stepchildren in the same manner, no risk of double recovery exists in the context of
nonmarital children. Moreover, the tie between the biological parent and the child
is often more permanent. By adopting the reasonable-necessities-of-life reliance test
and stating that it will apply the test to stepchildren and nonmarital children," 7 the
supreme court greatly limited a nonmarital child's opportunity to share in the death
benefits of the child's natural parents. Simultaneously, the decision appeared to
send the message that parents of nonmarital children do not owe a very high level
of responsibility to their children born out of wedlock. Sending this implicit
message ofminimal parental responsibility is in direct contravention of established
South Carolina case law and the very nature of the parent-child relationship."'
Regardless of whether the children are marital or not, an on-going, permanent
obligation exists to provide support for one's offspring by the mere existence ofthe
biological relationship." 9
Additionally, opponents of less stringent requirements for nonmarital children
may argue that the main purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is not to
address the parent's responsibility to the nonmarital child, but the employer's
obligation to the deceased worker. They may assert that the parent can always
decide to include the nonmarital child in an estate plan or make the nonmarital child

the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.' However, one of the main purposes of
workers' compensation is to keep injured employees and those lawfully dependent
upon them from becoming charges to society.'' To achieve this goal, the state
should demonstrate a commitment to encouraging parents to provide for their
children born out ofwedlock. Additionally, even ifnonmarital children do not have
to overcome "insurmountable barriers,"'" discrimination against them should not
be sanctioned. Trimble v. Gordon" made this precept clear years ago when it
116. S.C. CODEANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
117. Adams v. TexFi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217, 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995).
118. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 102, 190 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1972).
119. Id.; see Hewett v. Garrett, 163 S.E.2d 372, 375 (N.C. 1968); Lippard v. Southeastern
Express Co., 177 S.E. 801, 802 (N.C. 1935).
120. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971) (holding constitutional Louisiana
intestacy laws that had barred an acknowledged, nonmarital child from sharing equally with marital
children in part because the deceased might easily have modified his child's disfavored position). But
see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 773, 776 (1977) (stating that "the focus on the presence or
absence of an insurmountable barrier [to recovery] is somewhat of an analytical anomaly" and striking
a statute that allowed nonmarital children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers
while marital children could inherit by intestate succession from either parent).
121. Flemon,259 S.C. at 104, 190 S.E.2d at 754.
122. See supranotes 7 & 28.

123. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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criticized such an argument as an "analytical anomaly."' 2 4
B. The Flemon Rule is the Best Approach
1.

Justice

The South Carolina Supreme Court stated the better rule in Flemon v. DickertKeowee, Inc."?s In Flemon the court held that nonnarital children should recover
death benefits even without proof of actual dependence.' 26 The rule was based in
part on overturning the unjust historical position that denied a nonmarital child any
rights against the father and imposed no duty upon the father.'27 Society placed no
legal duty on fathers for the support ofnonmarital children because of the prevalent
notion that these children were said to befilius nullius, children of nobody.' Even
the Christian Church perpetuated inequitable treatment of innocent children by
viewing such a "child as a living sin,' ' 129 whose very existence was unlawful.' In
contemporary times, however, the Flemon decision demonstrates that a child is no
less a child of the father simply because the child was born out of wedlock.'' The
Flemon rule is the preferable rule because it represents an end to the unjust
treatment of nonmarital children.
2. Deference to the Legislature
The Flemon decision is the best approach not only for its laudable policy
reasons but also because of its deference to the legislature. The South Carolina

124. Id. at 773.
125. 259 S.C. 99, 190 S.E.2d 751 (1972).
126. Id. at 102, 190 S.E.2d at 753.
127. Id.
128. McGlohon v. Harlan, 254 S.C. 207, 211, 174 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1970); cf.In re Dake, 180
N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ohio Juv. Ct. of Huron County 1961) ("[Ihe Decalog, which is the basis of our
moral code, specifically states that the sins ofthe fathers may be visited upon the children unto the third
and fourth generation, so that the argument against making the children suffer for the mother's wrong
can be attacked on ethical grounds.").
129. Susan E. Satava, DiscriminationAgainst the Unacknowledgedillegitimate Child and the
Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. RV. 933, 934 (1996). Indeed, the Old Testament commands
that "[a] bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to his tenth generation shall he
not enter into the congregation of the Lord." Deuteronomy 23:2.
130. KRAusE, supranote 12, at 1-2.
131. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 247 N.E.2d 601,603 (Il. 1969) (decrying "the
harsh doctrines of the common law relating to the rights of illegitimate children" and noting that "the
underlying social attitudes which produced these doctrines have yielded to more enlightened judicial
and legislative action"); cf Russell v. Johnson, 42 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942) ("We are not
impressed with the zeal of the insurance carrier in proclaiming the tenets of morality for the purpose
of preventing minor innocent children from being declared dependents [under the workers'
compensation act]. We think their rights should [not] be measured and determined.., by the crime or
immorality of their mother.").
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General Assembly modeled its workers' compensation statute after the North
Carolina statute.' In the absence of an express dictate otherwise, when the
language incorporated into a statute is substantially similar to that appearing in
another statute, accepted precepts ofstatutory construction deem that the legislature
presumably intended the terms to have the same construction as the terms in the
other statute.' Here, the General Assembly presumably knew of the existing
Lippard v. Southeastern Express Co.'34 construction when it modeled South
Carolina's statute after North Carolina's statute.'35 In Lippardthe North Carolina
Supreme Court construed the term "dependency" in the workers' compensation act
to "confer[] upon the child the right to support by its father" as an outgrowth ofthe
parent-child biological relationship. 36 Because it opted not to include an express
disclaimer of this rule and instead adopted the identical statutory language, South
Carolina must have intended that the Lippardrule apply. 37 Additionally, the South
Carolina Supreme Court cited Lippard with approval in Barr's Next of Kin v.
Cherokee, Inc.'13 and in Flemon. 39 Consequently, the General Assembly at least
has tolerated this construction because no amendments have been enacted which
would vitiate the construction that nonmarital children not actually dependent are
entitled to compensation benefits. 4 '
3. Adams May Violate the Equal ProtectionClause
In Adams the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the Workers'
Compensation Act to require nonmarital children to demonstrate actual dependence
before they can recover workers' compensation death benefits, while
simultaneously allowing apresumption of actual dependence for marital children.4
In short, the Act treats nonmarital children differently. For this differential treatment
to survive intermediate scrutiny, it must be substantially related to an important
governmental interest.44 The government may argue an important state interest in
protecting legitimate family relationships. 43 Although admittedly an important state
interest,' 44 the differential treatment of marital and nonmarital children in the South

132. Flemon, 259 S.C. at 101, 190 S.E.2d at 752.
133. Id. at 102-03, 190 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Fuller v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 128 S.C.
14, 22, 121 S.E. 478, 481 (1924)).
134. 177 S.E. 801 (N.C. 1935).
135. Flemon, 259 S.C. at 103, 190 S.E.2d at 753.
136. Lippard,177 S.E. at 802.
137. Flemon, at 102-03, 190 S.E.2d at 753.
138. 220 S.C. 447, 454, 466, 68 S.E.2d 440, 443, 449 (1951).
139. Flemon, 259 S.C. at 102, 190 S.E.2d at 752-53.
140. Id. at 103, 190 S.E.2d at 753.
141. Adams v. TexFi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217, 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995).
142. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
143. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
144. Id.
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Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, as construed byAdams, would probably not
promote such an interest because "persons will [not] shun illicit relations because
145
the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation.'
This determination has been repeatedly affirmed by subsequent cases and
46
commentators. 1

The government may also argue an important interest ensures only those
persons that truly rely on the decedent for support should receive death benefits, and
marital children are more likely than nonmarital children actually to reside with and
depend on the decedent for support.'4 7 However, such an argument may not have
any basis in fact. For instance, the high divorce rate in this country 148 and the
tendency of courts, at least historically, to award custody to mothers,' 49 mean that
even many marital children are not likely to live with their fathers. Consequently,
any distinction drawn on such speculative grounds should fail because it has little
empirical basis. Additionally, current statutes make parents just as responsible for
the support of nonmarital children as for marital children. 5°
Alternatively, the asserted state interest for the distinction may simply be
administrative convenience in disguise: allowing the legislature and courts to avoid
the burden and cost of specific case-by-case determinations of dependency by
presuming marital children depend on the decedent for actual support. However,
administrative convenience does not satisfy the important governmental interest

145. Id.

146. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 n.13 (1977); see also New Jersey Welfare Rights
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (voiding a welfare program that recognized only marital and
adopted children because nonmarital children bear no responsibility for their status at birth and
penalizing them by discouraging persons from having children outside wedlock or encouraging them
to marry "is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent" (quoting Weber, 406 U.S.
at 175)); KRAUSE, supranote 12, at 75 (noting how the rising nonmarital child birth rate indicates that
adult sexual behavior is not guided by the possible differential treatment of nonmarital children and
how the failure to impose economic burdens on fathers of nonmarital children may actually encourage
illegitimacy over marriage); idat 161,171-72 (detailing how only 20% of 2031 families in Illinois in
1971 agreed that discrimination imposed by law on nonmarital children is an effective way to
discourage sexual intercourse between unmarried persons and that 96% agreed that the law should not
disadvantage nonmarital children for the misdeeds of their parents).
147. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 173 (discussing and rejecting state's argument that nonmarital
children are less in need of workers' compensation benefits receipts than marital children because
"illegitimate[s are] more often not under care in the home of the father nor even supported by him").
148. See Barbara Mayer, DivorceesClean House,StartFreshRedecoratingCanBe Therapeutic,

ARiz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 1997, at 30 (noting that 43% of all marriages end in divorce and that 40% of
marriages end within two years ofthe commitment); Barbara Mayer, Don'tRepine-Redecorate,NmVs
&OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 1, 1997, at E2 (same statistics).
149. See Pullen v. Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 127, 169 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1969) ("[When] the mother
is found to be a fit and proper person and the children are of 'tender years,' it is in the best interest of
the children to be in the custody of their natural mother."); Powell v. Powell, 231 S.C. 283, 286, 98
S.E.2d 764, 765 (1957) (recognizing the right of the mother to custody of the children of tender years
even when the mother is the party in fault).
150. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (making no distinction

between marital and nonmarital children for purposes of parental rights and duties).
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prong of the intermediate scrutiny test.'"' Similarly, conditioning the receipt of
death benefits, like support payments, on society's view that nonmarital children are
somehow less deserving or less in need of monetary support is impermissible and
will fail intermediate scrutiny. Finally, the distinction in the South Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act as construed by Adams is not substantially related to
the state interest regarding problems of proof"2 because the Act's requirement that
a nonmarital child be acknowledged' before receiving the statutory presumption
54
of dependence, and thus death benefits, minimizes any risk of specious claims.'
Despite these possible justifications, which might sustain an added burden
under the intermediate scrutiny test, at least one lower court has asserted that "the
illegitimate child cannot be subjected to added requirements of actual dependency
and living in the household if the same requirements are not applied to legitimate
children."'5 5 If this position is accepted by South Carolina courts, then the additional
requirement of dependency imposed on nonmarital children fails constitutional
scrutiny.
4. PerverseSituationsResult ifthe Adams Test Is Applied to Nonmarital
Children
If the Adams standard mandates the workers' compensation commission to
determine dependency by looking only at whether the parent is actually providing
support to a child, then this approach has perverse repercussions. If the father
irresponsibly avoids his obligation to provide for his child, then the child cannot be
56
considered dependent on the father, and the child cannot recover death benefits.
This result is contrary to society's interest in placing responsibility for the care of
children in their parent's hands. Instead, all parents, if able, should provide support
151. See supranotes 42-43 and accompanying text.
152. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1971).
153. S.C. CODEANN. § 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
154. Cf Bums v. Robert Miller Constr., Inc., 437 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727 (App. Div. 1981) (holding
requirement of at least some informal acknowledgment ofpaternity by the decedent before anonmarital
child can recover workers' compensation death benefits is substantially related to the important
governmental interest of "facilitati[ng] ... potentially difficult problems of proof and ...
prevent[ing]
...
spurious claims").
This fear of spurious claims being "lodged against innocent men as a means of harassment and
extortion" is described by some commentators as a mere perpetuation of male dominance in society.
ZINGO &EARLY, supranote 1, at 24-25. The authors noted:
[S]ociety did not want to support non-marital children; putative fathers did not
want to be harassed; society did not want to punish innocent men. Both the
alleged fathers and the community at large feared that single mothers would
endanger their respective resources.... As a result, single mothers were once
more ensnared and sacrificed on the altar of androcentricity.

Id. at 25.
155. Foy v. Vann, 386 So. 2d 1141, 1144 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
156. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 42-1-70, 42-9-110 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (authorizing wholly dependent
presumption if illegitimate dependent).
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for their children.
In addition to tying the child's entitlement to the laxity of the natural parent
who plays no role in the child's life, theAdams test would also punish a nonmarital
child for the laxity of the parent or custodian who does not seek paternal support
under section 20-7-90. If the caregiver had simply petitioned the court for support
payments from the absent parent, the resulting legal obligation for support would
offer a confirmed basis for finding dependency under section 42-1-70. ',1 But
without the petition, the natural father succeeds in evading his responsibility for the
child during the father's lifetime, and the child is denied workers' compensation
benefits even after the father dies.
VI. CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court has indicated in language which is arguably
dicta that nonmarital children must demonstrate actual dependency to recover
workers' compensation death benefits." 8 Although not entirely without support, this
approach may effectively overturn case law, offend established policies of our state,
refuse to defer to the legislature, arguably violate the Equal Protection Clause, and
lead to perverse results. The court "'should.., decide to widen its doctrinal inquiry,
seeking more inclusive ways of looking at these issues, [and thus] the.., problem
of [birth status] will be seen clearly as a problem of responsibility and care in the
web of connection."" 9 Only with a resounding commitment to equality and a keen
understanding of our interdependence will society truly conquer the injustices faced
by nonmarital children. "Now, [legislators and judges], stand up for bastards!"' 6
LauraH. Huggins

157. See Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 104, 190 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1972); Day
v. Day, 216 S.C. 334, 341-42, 58 S.E.2d 83, 86-87 (1950); Hewett v. Garrett, 163 S.E.2d 372, 375
(N.C. 1968).
158. Adams v. TexFi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217, 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995).
159. ZINGO & EARLY, supra note 1, at 12 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kenneth L.
Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447, 501).
160. WILLIAMSHAmKPEAm,KiNGLEARact 1,se. 2, line 22 (George Lyman Kittredge ed. 1940).
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